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Abstract: In this article, we consider the themes and reception of To Sam Ja
(That’s Me), a Big Brother–style Balkan reality TV show filmed in Macedonia
in 2004 and 2005 that featured several cast members from former Yugoslav
republics living together. Drawing on examples taken from the production and
reception of To Sam Ja, we explore the way in which the show manages politi-
cal and economic conflicts by transposing them into the realm of the personal. 
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Résumé : Dans cet article, nous considérons la réception de To Sam Ja (C’est
moi), une émission de téléréalité réalisée en Macédoine en 2004 et 2005. À la
manière de Big Brother et Loft Story, To Sam Ja met en vedette plusieurs
représentants d’anciennes républiques yougoslaves vivant ensemble. En nous
fondant sur des exemples provenant de la production et de la réception de To
Sam Ja, nous explorons la manière dont cette émission gère les conflits
politiques et économiques en les transposant dans le domaine personnel.
Mots clés : L’ancienne Yougoslavie; Téléréalité; Néolibéralisme; Individualisme;
Nationalisme
Introduction
In an era in which reality TV has so permeated media culture that it has become
a ready metaphor for both politics and business, the genre has already made sev-
eral tentative forays into the realm of the political (Andrejevic, 2004). In both
England and Australia, reality shows nicknamed “Poll Star” have selected and
fielded candidates for public office. The African version of Big Brother touched
on hot-button religious and political issues, as have some U.S. formats, including
Wife Swap and the never-aired Welcome to the Neighborhood, which featured
conservative White families in Texas deciding who should win a house in their
neighbourhood. The genre lends itself to the kind of experimentation pioneered
Zala Volc˘ic˘ and Mark Andrejevic are Postdoctoral Fellows at the Centre for Critical and Cultural
Studies, Level 4, Forgan Smith Tower, University of Queensland, QLD 4072, Australia. 
Email: z.volcic@uq.edu.au. Mark Andrejevic is the author of two books: Reality TV: The Work of
Being Watched and iSpy. Email: m.andrejevic@uq.edu.au.
Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 34 (2009) 7-24
©2009 Canadian Journal of Communication Corporation
 
by behavioural psychologists in the 1960s and early 70s and has been used to
dramatize issues of race and class (recurrent themes in the “wife swapping”
shows, in which families of very different backgrounds trade mothers for a short
time). Indeed, part of what this paper sets out to explore is the way in which the
commercial imperatives of a cheap, portable programming format align them-
selves with the promise of an engineered “social experiment” to reinforce, para-
doxically, a naturalized version of nationalism. This is in keeping with the
tendency of more politically inclined reality formats to serve as a forum for
exploring social issues in microcosm—a strategy that has a tendency to abstract
away from broader social and economic issues in order to focus on interpersonal
relations. 
Although much of the academic research on reality TV has focused on for-
mats in Western Europe and North America, the genre is a staple of low-budget
programming around the world and has had successful formats in Asia and
Africa. Jacobs (2007) has usefully pointed out the political and public discussions
around issues of globalization, democracy, and African unity that followed the
success of Big Brother Africa. One of the common denominators of international
press coverage in a variety of regions, including Africa and China, has been the
framing of voting-format shows (including talent competitions such as Pop Idol
and elimination shows such as Big Brother) as forms of cultural democracy, or
what Hartley calls “democratainment” (Hartley, 2008, p. 132). In the case of Big
Brother Africa, for example, Jacobs notes that “[m]any observers of the African
media scene chose to see in such reactions a broad-based will to democracy”
(2007, p. 858). Such sentiments are characteristic of the equation of market par-
ticipation with political democracy that has become one of the signature confla-
tions of the neo-liberal era. Even war-torn Iraq has turned its strife into camera
fodder with several reality formats, including one devoted to the confessions of
insurgents and a home-grown version of Extreme Makeover: Home Edition that
helps citizens rebuild homes destroyed in the fighting.
This article focuses on another war-torn region, the Balkans, and in particu-
lar the former Yugoslav republics, whose conflicts have become raw material for
another successful reality format. To Sam Ja (That’s Me) was a reality show sim-
ilar in structure to (but unaffiliated with) the successful Big Brother franchise.
The show started in 2004 and ended in 2006, and it was one of the many reality
series that have become successful in Eastern Europe, mostly because of their
low production costs. In the past couple of years, reality shows have dominated
many Eastern European television markets, which have featured shows including
Pop Idol, Big Brother, Wife Swap, The Chosen, Weakest Link, Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire, The Dating Game, and Take It or Leave It. A local format based in
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Sarajevo sought to reunite citizens of the war-torn region
by allowing them to communicate with former friends and neighbours from
whom they had become alienated during the war via videotaped messages. The
show, which aired in all of the former Yugoslav republics, was described by its
creators as part of a larger project “aimed at assisting reconciliation in the
Balkans” (Associated Press Newswires, 2005). For the most part, however, the
reality TV boom has been supported by U.S.-based Central European Media
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Enterprises, which operates television stations in Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine. In Slovenia, for example, the show Bar
(Big Brother) was the most-watched TV show in the 18-49 age group in the 2006
season (Marko, 2007). 
The show To Sam Ja (That’s Me) assembled residents of all six nations of the
former Yugoslavia to live together in a camera-equipped house promoted by pro-
ducers as a model of post-conflict harmony. Described by its Macedonian pro-
ducer Zoran Ristoski as the first pan-Balkan reality show, To Sam Ja took shape
against the background of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, when Yugoslavia frac-
tured violently into the constituent republics that have since resumed an uncom-
fortable, contentious, and violence-prone co-existence as separate nation states.
The show’s goal, according to its creator, was to use commercial entertainment as
a means for promoting communication and understanding among young people
in the region (Zoran Ristoski, personal communication, February 4, 2006). In
keeping with the social-psychological pretences of the genre, the show also billed
itself as an experiment in learning what happens when a group of young people
who speak different languages, come from different countries, and follow differ-
ent religions, but share a conflict-ridden past, are thrown together.
As in the case of other political reality shows, To Sam Ja promised to supple-
ment the shortcomings of reality with a model for overcoming them in reality TV.
To Sam Ja was framed as an attempt to negotiate ongoing ethnic, religious, and
regional tensions symbolically—and in doing so, to invoke a sense of nostalgia
for the pan-Slavic dream of Tito’s Yugoslavia: the hope that Slavic identity might
be strong enough to foster unity amid diversity. This hope is of a piece with the
phenomenon of Yugo-nostalgia that has emerged, albeit unevenly, in the post-
Yugoslav states’ confrontation with the sometimes brutal realities of postsocial-
ism. Like other forms of nostalgia, Yugo-nostalgia mobilizes the appeal of the
past by emphasizing its (often unfulfilled) potential selectively and de-emphasiz-
ing its less savoury aspects (Volc˘ic˘, 2007). Insofar as To Sam Ja resuscitated in
commercial form the unfulfilled dream of pan-Slavic community, it is perhaps
not surprising that it was most popular in those republics that suffered the worst
consequences of the breakup of Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, Croatia, and
Serbia. 
This article uses To Sam Ja as a means of exploring the role played by Yugo-
nostalgia in negotiating current and past political tensions in the region through
interviews with producers and cast members of the show, as well as a considera-
tion of the show’s public reception in the popular press and online in the former
republics of Yugoslavia. The following discussion provides a sketch of the histor-
ical-political world of postsocialist Yugoslavia that constitutes the show’s back-
ground setting. It then situates To Sam Ja within the broader context of reality TV,
a genre that feeds off of contemporary social issues by transposing them into the
register of entertainment and thereby promoting a distanced and ultimately inert
relationship of viewers to the spectacle of politics. 
Drawing on examples taken from the production and reception of To Sam Ja,
we argue that reality TV politics—politics as entertainment—serve the double
function of relegating citizens to the role of consumers and fostering a knowing
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attitude toward the staged character of real politics. Second, we explore the way
in which the show manages political and economic conflicts by transposing them
into the realm of the personal. In this regard, the show bears a certain affinity with
another multinational format: that of Big Brother Africa, which, as Jacobs (2007)
notes, lent itself to a politics of individual responsibility and nationalism, at least
in some quarters. In this regard, our analysis of To Sam Ja might be described as
an attempt to enlist the show as a means of reflecting upon its social context and,
more specifically, of considering the way it transposes political tensions into the
realm of commercial entertainment.
The political-historical context of the former Yugoslavia
The cast members of To Sam Ja were all drawn from nations that were once a part
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a patchwork
country created after World War II from six different republics: Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. According to its
socialist “engineers,” Yugoslavia (literally, “the land of the Southern Slavs”)
promised to overcome nationalist and ethnic tensions by stressing (working-)
class identity and international solidarity. President Josip Broz Tito promoted the
idea that economic and political homogenization would lead to the creation of a
pure workers’ state (Woodward, 1995). 
After the death of Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia faced an economic and social cri-
sis that eventually deteriorated into civil unrest and the wars of the 1990s—the
period during which To Sam Ja’s cast members came of age. Yugoslavia collapsed
in 1990, and most scholars agree that the factors that triggered the violent deteri-
oration of its version of pan-Slavic unity and working-class solidarity were part
of other external and internal transformations, including the fall of communism
in Eastern Europe, the Slovene and Croatian independence movements, and the
rise of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia (Banac,
1992; Hayden, 1996). Both major ethnic groups, Serbs and Croats, compounded
a long history of tension by claiming to have been the victims of a continued per-
secution by the other, whom they accused of dominating the Yugoslav federation.
The wars of the 1990s have been described as the bloodiest conflicts in
Europe since the end of World War II (Skjelsbaek & Smith, 2001). These were
also the first conflicts since World War II to have been formally described as
genocidal, and many of the key individual participants were subsequently
charged with war crimes. However, as many scholars argue (Bieber, 2004), there
is a denial of the past and of the consequences of resurgent nationalism in the
region, which leads to a failure to confront past atrocities. This has fostered a
resulting “syndrome of victimization” (Bieber, 2004), which exacerbates hostili-
ties, defers reconciliation, and provides ideological legitimation for everyday dis-
criminatory practices and the promulgation of nationalist stereotypes, as well as
the ongoing denial of ethnic cleansing and the negative consequences of resur-
gent nationalism.
Today, the former Yugoslav states live separate and very different lives.
Slovenia was the only republic that survived the violent collapse of Yugoslavia
without much bloodshed and is seen as the most successful of the former
Republics. Croatia experienced a violent war and several years of authoritarian
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nationalism under president Franjo Tudjman (1991-1999). It is now in the process
of restructuring its economic and political systems. The Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina went through three years of bloody interethnic war (1992-1995)
between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Although fighting ceased in 1995
and the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the violent wars, the conflict
is not resolved, and Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a deeply divided state.
Serbia under president Slobodan Milosevic (1989-2000) fought wars in Croatia,
Bosnia, and the province of Kosovo. In February 2008, Kosovo Albanians pro-
claimed independence from Serbia. On a referendum on May 21, 2006, the
Republic of Montenegro voted narrowly for independence from Serbia.
Macedonia came close to civil war in 2001 when Macedonian-Albanian rebels
violently demanded greater rights for the ethnic Albanian minority. The conflict
set off a wave of refugees. Ethnic fragmentation and the “uncertain transitions”
from socialism to democracy (Kolar-Panov, 1999; Verdery & Burawoy, 1999)
have contributed to the countries’ current situation of economic, social, and polit-
ical instability.
To Sam Ja: The first pan-Balkan reality show 
This recent history of nationalist and ethnic conflicts provides the raw material
for Zoran Ristoski’s reality TV experiment. The show started out as an exclu-
sively Macedonian program, similar in format to the successful Big Brother fran-
chise, with a Macedonian cast whose trials and tribulations were aired on
Macedonian public TV. At first, the show had moderate ratings. But in its third
season (2004/2005), the concept of the show was changed, and To Sam Ja started
to be advertised and promoted as “the first Balkan reality show.” The producers
decided to place twelve contestants of six different nationalities (a man and a
woman from each country) from the former Yugoslavia in a house in Skopje,
Macedonia, where they engaged in a range of routines of daily life, from the mun-
dane rituals of cooking and cleaning to talking with friends, playing sports, mak-
ing music, and falling in love. Moderators, also from different former Yugoslav
countries, entered the house to give the participants different tasks and chal-
lenges. Occasionally the house was visited by celebrities, including singers and
movie stars from the participating countries.1
All five languages from the former Yugoslavia (Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian
[Serbo-Croatian], Macedonian, and Albanian) were spoken in the house and by
the hosts, who provided daily summaries of the show. Despite the multiple lan-
guages, the show used neither subtitles nor dubbing and made no effort to trans-
late for either viewers or cast members. The assumption was that former
Yugoslavs would understand the polyglot format. Moreover, as the Macedonian
producer Zoran Ristoski put it (somewhat misleadingly, given the decontextual-
ization and dehistoricization that lay at the heart of the format), the goal was to
model a community of difference: “It is all about respect for the other and for
individual communication” (Zoran Ristoski, personal communication, February
4, 2006). Ironically, the (officially defunct) Serbo-Croatian language soon
became dominant, with all the participants communicating in Serbo-Croatian,
and that attracted much public criticism for reproducing the Serbo-Croatian lin-
guistic hegemony of the former Yugoslavia (Sopar, 2005).
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The audience, like the show’s cast, ranged from across the former
Yugoslavia. To Sam Ja was broadcast on both public channels and the satellite
channel of the public broadcaster in Macedonia, as well as on commercial televi-
sion stations in several former Yugoslav republics, including Serbia, Bosnia,
Croatia, and Slovenia. Because it was carried by the satellite channel MKTV
SAT, the show was accessible to a global audience. The show succeeded in
attracting an international audience, with callers to the evening show from across
Europe, the U.S.A., Canada, and Australia. Not surprisingly, most of the viewers
were of Yugoslav origin or members of one of the national communities in the
region. The evening installment of To Sam Ja showcased feedback from this
international audience, running crawls composed of telephone and text messages
from viewers around the world—but mostly from countries with large diasporic
communities originating in the former Yugoslav republics (such as Canada, the
U.S.A., and Australia). Two contestants were voted out of the house every 20
days by phone calls and SMS messages from viewers at home; the last remaining
resident won a cash prize and a car. 
The show also had an interactive website, which producer Zoran Ristoski
claimed drew roughly 1.5 million visitors over the course of the show. The rat-
ings were high: again according to Ristoski, the show had more than 5.6 million
viewers on average. In the first three days, some 340,000 people visited the
show’s website (Vecˇernji List, 2004). Although international market research
shows that Big Brother formats are usually most popular with a younger demo-
graphic (in the 16-44 age range) (Hill, 2002), this was not the case with To Sam
Ja. Audience research showed that it was the 40-49 age group that watched the
show most (25%), followed by the 50-70 age group (21%), and then the 10-19
demographic (18%) (Sopar, 2005). 
The research does not specify reasons for the idiosyncratic skew in the rat-
ings—at least with respect to Western European and U.S. formats. However, it
may have to do with the fact that interest in the former Yugoslavia tends to be
greater among those for whom the pan-Slavic dream espoused by Tito’s rule in
the postwar era retains some purchase—perhaps not least because of its failure.
Those who grew up in the post-Yugoslav era came of age in a time when the pub-
lic emphasis was upon a revitalized nationalism that highlighted the differences
between the former republics rather than their shared history or any sense of
Slavic unity.
On a slightly more mundane note, it is worth pointing out that older viewers
are more likely to be comfortable with Serbo-Croatian, the language of the To Sam
Ja house and of former Yugoslavia. In the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the
separate republics resuscitated their national languages and worked to differenti-
ate dialects that Tito had sought to unify. Indeed, the show recalled the attempts at
Yugoslav unity supported by Tito’s regime. The appeal to an older demographic
proved effective. When the show switched from an exclusively Macedonian cast
to one that included representatives from all the former republics, the ratings went
up in Macedonia (they almost doubled after the first two seasons), and the show
became popular throughout the region. In Macedonia, the show was, by its third
season, the most watched program after the national news.2
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Reducing the political and historical to the personal
If the premise of To Sam Ja was to recreate an experiment in former-Yugoslav
unity, this promise reincarnated a political project in commodified form. To par-
aphrase Marx’s formulation: history repeated itself, first as tragedy and then as
prime-time entertainment. It is against the background of the violent failure of
Yugoslavia’s political project of Slavic unity that To Sam Ja’s director sought to
resuscitate a postsocialist version of unity via reality TV. Precisely because it was
a reality show and not postwar Balkan reality, Ristoski was able to invite the cast
members to get to know one another not as representatives of national stereo-
types, tokens of ethnic rifts and violence, but as individuals. He claimed that in
so doing, the show attempted to overcome the ethnic, religious, and nationalist
barriers that have divided former Yugoslavs in the post-breakup era. In Ristoski’s
words, “The goal was to bring together all these young people from different cul-
tural backgrounds in former Yugoslavia . . . [In] coming together . . . and living
together peacefully . . . [they were] proving that it is possible, of course, to . . .
enjoy each other and learn from each other” (Zoran Ristoski, personal communi-
cation, February 4, 2006).
Breaking down barriers, for reality TV at least, often means abstracting away
from the social relations that foster them and thereby forcing everyone to “start
over” at the same level, creating a TV-world approximation of the liberal ideal of
equality of opportunity. In this regard, the fact that cast members on To Sam Ja are
taken out of their own national contexts and placed in simulated equality for the
duration of the show serves the added function of enforcing an abstract sense of
equality. That is to say, the show trades upon the promise of diversity only insofar
as it is something to be overcome or left behind. This also means abstracting away
from historical circumstances—a process that is reinforced by the invocation of a
pseudo-social-scientific experimentalism. The predictable result is that repressed
historical and social relations—albeit unrecognized as such—have a way of resur-
facing in the characteristics attributed to the individual cast members. 
In this respect, reality TV engages in what might be described as fetishism at
the interpersonal level: the misrecognition of social constructions as elements of
individual essence. This has long been the drawback of certain empirical social-
scientific approaches: in abstracting away from larger social and structural issues,
they tend to incorporate these as givens and thereby reproduce as ahistorical
truths the eminently historical conditions that structure the findings. In this
regard, there is an affinity between empirical social science and commodifica-
tion—an affinity highlighted by Theodor Adorno’s assertion that in the capitalist
era, “the experiment became a surrogate for authentic experience” (as quoted in
Buck-Morss, 1977, p. 77). We might think, for example, of the logic of experi-
mental deterrence targeted by Baudrillard (1994): the forms of interaction, mod-
elling, gaming, and simulation that have come to characterize both military
planning and marketing campaigns. 
Experiences to be desired or avoided are modelled in one form of laboratory
or another and serve to supplement or replace extra-experimental experience as a
basis for decision-making. The result is that particular sets of prejudices, exclu-
sions, and abstractions from historical experience make their way into the models,
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where they are “laundered” by the experimental method. Such is also the funda-
mental operation of the market, which relies upon abstracting away from the his-
tory that shapes free exchange as a presupposition of its alleged freedom. It is in
this regard that those who champion the “natural” character of markets downplay
the distributions of property they presuppose and reproduce. It is in this double
sense—as both a structured surrogate for decision-making and as a means of nat-
uralizing historical conditions—that we might read the affinity between capitalism
and the experimental model alluded to by Adorno and enacted by To Sam Ja.
Since the rise of social psychology, contrivance has been presented as a means
of extracting and isolating authentic elements of human behaviour. The experi-
mental character of many reality shows transposes this logic into the realm of
entertainment. Thus, for reality TV producers, the definition of authenticity relies
upon the ostensible surrender of their own control within the frame of an admit-
tedly contrived setting. As producer Mary-Ellis Bunim, who helped create MTV’s
successful The Real World series put it, 
We can’t predict where conflict will arise and we don’t do anything to
provoke it. . . . Sure you can see beforehand some of the differences in
attitudes, but how far and deep those differences will go, we can’t predict.
That is what makes it fascinating for us and for the audience. (Weinstein,
1993, p. 8) 
Nevertheless, the entire structure of the show and many attributes of its setting are
managed carefully by producers to create optimal conditions for conflict, drama,
and romance—the staples of reality TV entertainment.
Similarly, To Sam Ja’s producer described the show in terms of a social
experiment: a carefully selected group of individuals was forced to follow a fixed
itinerary and to engage in a carefully planned sequence of activities in order to
reveal how group members would react to and interact with one another and to
force them to confront the “real” people behind the stereotypes. In Ristoski’s
words, “We ask our participants to be who they are . . . and to try to leave their
old stories, prejudices and stereotypes behind . . . to get to know each other as
people in order to show all former citizens of Yugoslavia that deep down, we are
all the same: peaceful, love-making people” (Zoran Ristoski, personal communi-
cation, February 4, 2006). The formulation is a telling one insofar as it opposes a
sense of authentic identity to the contingency of personal history and historical
pressures. The true essence of an individual, according to this account, is some-
thing that can be extracted in the controlled conditions of the laboratory from the
historical circumstances in which it is embedded. The result, as implied above, is
a naturalization of history—both its repression and the consequent return of the
repressed in its essentialized form as an aspect of individual character. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the default image of the subject revealed by
Ristoski’s commercial version of pan-Slavic unity was that of homo
consumeris—the hip, youthful shopper of the MTV generation. Cast members
embraced this version of dehistoricized, global, commodified individualism, wel-
coming the chance to leave the legacy of conflict behind. One of the participants
put it this way: “Look. . . . I believe that here we are all good and equal . . . regard-
less of our national or religious differences. . . . We are all young, love pop cul-
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ture . . . and that’s it. . . . We don’t care about differences, all we want to do is
have some fun here in our house” (personal communication, October 1, 2006).
Producers framed the participants as a “future generation”—an ideal target
market, united by communication technology and global commercial entertain-
ment. Ristoski claimed that “this is an Internet generation, and not some kind of
unique ‘national cuisine.’. . . All of them are young, alive, love popular culture . . .
and love to chat on the Internet” (Zoran Ristoski, personal communication,
February 4, 2006). The appeal is to a version of the consumer as transcendental
subject characterized by a universal desire to consume and communicate in terms
structured largely by global capitalism and abstracted from the vicissitudes of
national history and Balkan identity. It is a marketplace version of transnational
identity that might be described as the obverse, in an era of global capitalism, of
Le Monde’s famous response to the 9/11 attacks: “We Are All Americans.” 
As in the case of the social-psychology experiments so often referenced by
producers and promotional materials, reality TV shows promise an element of
insight about human nature in addition to their entertainment value. The promise
of reality is not, as pundits so often assume, that everything on the show is uncon-
trived, but rather that the structured elements of the show, the “petri dish” created
by producers, can nonetheless help yield insights into social life or human
nature—insights that might not be possible to gain without the structured element
of artificiality. In the case of To Sam Ja, the ostensibly educational element goes
a bit further: the producer hopes to model the possibility of post-conflict harmony
for the MTV generation, thanks in part to the amnesia provided by commercial
entertainment. As Ristoski, put it, the program’s goal is to
show how young people from the region of former Yugoslavia can inter-
act and socialize after all the conflicts. Young people need to go on, live
their lives, and have hobbies, lifestyles . . . while not being pressured by
past events. History is history, let’s leave it alone. We need to forget, and
focus on the positive aspects of our lives . . . and emphasize the role of
each individual in all this. . . . So really, the show tries to present the par-
ticipants’ characters as much as possible. (Zoran Ristoski, personal com-
munication, February 4, 2006)
What is already an internalized convention of U.S. reality shows, based largely
on their cultural context, becomes an explicit goal of To Sam Ja: to suppress histor-
ical narratives and thus reduce the political and ethnic tensions that they help to
structure. Only in a space in which such tensions have been relegated to the back-
ground, Ristoski suggests, can the consumerist version of pan-Slavic harmony be
realized. The goal here is to cut through the Gordian tangle of Balkan identities not
by weaving them together, but by erasing them wholesale, which perhaps explains
why the version of unity envisioned by Ristoski has not yet succeeded. 
The result is the naturalization and, hence, reinforcement of the stereotypes
that exacerbated the very tensions the show sought to defuse. The invitation to
abstract away from history serves to attach these stereotypes not to a particular
sociohistorical context, but rather to the “essential” nature of each individual. The
paradoxical result is that by naturalizing character traits and attaching them to an
individual chosen to represent a specific ethnic group, these traits come to be
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associated with the essence of the represented group. The attempt to abstract
away from history serves not to eliminate the stereotypes, but to reproduce them. 
That is, it serves to portray particular, stereotypical traits not as the result of
historical circumstances and conflicts, but as core elements of the essential char-
acter of a people, as embodied in its selected representative. Consider, for exam-
ple, the reaction of cast members to one of the challenges engineered for them by
the show’s producers: to write and perform in Skopje’s main square a song com-
memorating the victims of the 2006 tsunami that struck parts of Southeast Asia.
After the public concert, debates about mixed marriages took place on the show.
All of the cast members, with the exception of the Albanian participant, expressed
their tolerance toward marriages between different ethnic and religious groups.
The Albanian participant in contrast argued that mixed marriages should be pro-
hibited since one cannot really mix different religions. One of the Serbian cast
members responded with the observation that “such religious fundamentalism is
characteristic only for you Muslims.” 
An Albanian participant, Admir, was at the center of another conflict, this
time with the Macedonian cast member Drago—again, perhaps not a coincidence
given the tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in the country at
the time, although this was not directly referenced in the exchange. The conflict
started with an escalating exchange of nationalistic statements and culminated
with Admir’s threatened plan to stab Drago while he was sleeping. To compound
threat with insult, he showed Drago his genitals—an incident that generated both
widespread publicity and debates about decency rules governing broadcasting in
Macedonia. The rest of the participants attempted to de-escalate the confrontation
but avoided more in-depth discussion of the incident, which nevertheless con-
firmed the Serb participant’s stated mistrust of Muslims. 
In a personal interview, one of the participants claimed that “you cannot trust
Albanians. . . . Never. I knew that then, I know that now” (personal communica-
tion, January 20, 2006). One other cast member also referenced the incident to
make a broader generalization that reinforced the tendency in the region for each
group to look down on those to the south: “It was that incident . . . between Drago
and Admir, when I thought . . . Islamic radicals around us . . . kind of crazy south-
erners [juznjaki] . . . they just have this in their blood, you know, to fight” (per-
sonal communication, February 1, 2006).
Reinforcement of national(ist) stereotypes on Internet listservs
Not surprisingly, the stabbing threat sparked interest on Internet listservs devoted
to the show—interest that manifested itself in much more blatant stereotyping
under the cover of anonymity. A contributor to the listserv called “Vuk” invoked
a Bosnian military leader known for his ferocity to his enemies during the
Bosnian war: “Islamic terrorists . . . you are all like Naser Oric. . . . [L]ook at this
. . . they kill us all—when we sleep. . . . [T]hey even proudly say they will kill us
all. . . . The Albanians . . . Muslims . . . they are all the same. . . . [T]hey kill us
in reality, and on reality TV!”
The occasional manifestations of nationalism and ethnic tension on the show
were echoed and amplified in the anonymous free-for-all on the listservs. The
voting process whereby cast members were selected to remain in the house
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tended to provoke nationalist competition and rhetoric on all sides, but often with
distinct anti-Muslim overtones. Sentiments such as the following capture the gen-
eral tenor of such exchanges. As one post to the listserv, signed as “Dragan”
addressing the Serbian cast members and invoking the conflicts of World War II
put it, “Miodrag, Dijana, all the Serb nation is with you, kill the Ustase [members
of a Croatian movement that allied itself with the Nazis] while they sleep.” Other
posts continued this exchange: “Serbs, vote for Serbs!!!” or “Croats around the
world, unite and vote!” These posts tended to articulate ongoing prejudices with
current political claims and conspiracies, as in the case of one listerv contributor,
who identified himself only as “Proud Serb”: “Do you really want to know what’s
going on??? Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia are connecting with Syria,
Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia . . . they are all coming. . . . [F]orget peace and democ-
racy . . . [I]f we don’t stop them, we will be burnt.” 
Often the messages served to comment on contemporary political disputes
over borders and the postwar settlements. Again the general tenor can be captured
by a few selected posts: “Slovenes, peasants . . . you have no historical strength
whatsoever” or “Slovenes . . . you Alpine Serbs, greedy [profanity], you will
never put your dirty hands on the Croatian coast!” Indeed, the issue of the
Croatian coast—one of the most desirable real estate markets in the former
Yugoslavia and the subject of several competing land claims, came up repeatedly:
“Yes, yes, you are Europe, you Slovene asses, and we are the Balkans . . . but then
you come and want the Croatian sea and land. . . . [W]hat was ours in Yugoslavia,
remains ours. . . . [G]et lost!”
Those further from the fray would, on occasion, step back to reflect on the
more hate-filled messages—and perhaps to exacerbate them: “Watching this
show just proves to me how happy I am . . . far, far away from you all. . . . canada
[sic] saves me. . . . [Y]ou crazy [profanity] . . . [profanity] Serbs and Croats and
Bosnians . . . you are all the same.”
If the goal of the house was to model peaceful co-existence, the apparent
appeal to online fans was a pretext for indulging in public displays of intolerance
that reinforced the ethnic tensions fomented during the wars of the 1990s.
Although many different forms of exclusion and intolerance were manifested in
the online commentaries, the one that sticks out is the nationalist one (complete
with its sexist overtones). Apart from the manifest and diverse vulgarity of some
of the commentaries, what emerges from the listservs is the fact that the debates
have little direct connection with the show itself. Rather, the show served as a
jumping-off point for a full-fledged dive into ethnic and nationalist stereotyping. 
Nevertheless, the Macedonian producer and director, Zoran Ristoski, claimed
the show was, from the start, based on the goal of providing a celebration of “our
common South Slavic identity, of our different cultures, and to learn from each
other.” He rejected the theme of Yugo-nostalgia that characterized the show’s
popular reception: 
The show is not Yugo-nostalgic, even though some people see it this way.
People need to communicate after the wars . . . and they need to commu-
nicate especially when economic co-operation is in question—then, there
are no borders and limits. The show is about entertainment. . . . It is prac-
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tical in that it gives people what people want to see. (personal communi-
cation, February 4, 2006)
However, Ristoski performed a couple of provocative interventions that
helped draw media attention to the show. For example, the television stations in
Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia pulled To Sam Ja from the air on January 19, 2005,
for two days. The move was the result of a disagreement between the stations and
Ristoski, who made some changes to the show’s set, adding three large portraits of
Tito, a hammer-and-sickle insignia, a Tito signature, and the slogan of the
Communists’ prison colony, Goli Otok. He also wanted the show’s hosts to wear
white shirts and red handkerchiefs, a reference to Tito’s socialist youth brigade.
Anja Alavanja, one of the Croatian hosts, refused to participate in the show after
the request was made. She claimed, “It was too much to demand of us to be
dressed in those communist uniforms. . . . I refused to be a part of it, because I
know what a horrible system communism was” (Kriksˇic´, 2005, p. 5). One of the
participants responded by professing a salutary ignorance of the past: “What is that
all about . . . ? I am too young to remember Yugoslavia; I don’t want to remember
it. . . . We live in new times now. . . . Give us a break with the history and the past”
(personal communication, September 14, 2006). When asked about this incident,
Ristoski responded that “sometimes . . . you need to trigger a debate . . . be con-
troversial . . . all in order to reflect upon the problems around us. . . . Yugoslavia
was something real, and we need to respect this fact that we were all different, we
are different—different languages, ethnicities, religions, but we need to cherish
this” (Zoran Ristoski, personal communication, February 4, 2006). 
When pushed on the question of whether the show attempted to recreate
Yugoslavia, he responded playfully that “we are not occupying ourselves with
this question. We focus on more important dilemmas, such as whether the girls in
the house will finally take off their swimming costumes when they shower”
(Zoran Ristoski, personal communication, February 4, 2006). Ristoski subordi-
nates his show, then, to the logic of the marketplace and profit when he celebrates
difference. If the show’s participants for the most part avoided expressing overtly
confrontational nationalistic statements, the voting process (with text-messaging
included!) did precisely that: it resuscitated the old stereotypes and resulted in the
exclusion of cast members on the basis of nationalist themes. In the end, the invo-
cation of Tito’s version of socialism came across more as a ratings gimmick than
as an attempt to trigger political debate or to stake a claim to the ideals of
Yugoslavia’s socialist past.
Participation and relationship marketing
Unlike U.S. and Western European formats, To Sam Ja was broadcast repeatedly
throughout the day, with fresh installments of 10 to 15 minutes aired four times a
day and a daily summary of one to two hours in the evening. The program played,
in short, like a breaking news story on cable television, with repeated updates and
in-depth evening coverage. The summary show included highlights, analysis, and
live feeds of activities taking place within the house. Usually aired at 11:10 p.m.,
this summary-chat-show offered a so-called “Feature of the Day” (the selection of
the most interesting events in the house during the day) and ranked participants by
the number of votes they won, inviting viewers to submit votes. The viewers were
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offered the option to call into the show directly or to send SMS messages. And
they did call, from all the towns of former Yugoslavia and from abroad, comment-
ing on the events in the house and the behaviour of its residents. For example,
viewers, fans, and critics alike celebrated “the event” of the first sexual encounter
in the house—between a Serbian man and a Slovene woman—with a flurry of
posts, many of which made (sometimes crude) political analogies, such as, “[I]t
was worth seeing . . . a Serb screw a Slovene . . . but this time nicely and gently.” 
This reference was to the historical fact that the wars of the 1990s were pre-
ceded by economic conflicts between the republics. Serbia was seen as exploited
economically by Croatia and Slovenia, which explained its economic backward-
ness. Indeed, Slovenia was framed as a kind of a colonial power in the Yugoslav
context by the less developed regions—extracting raw materials cheaply from the
southern republics and selling the finished products back to them. 
Even if the love and flirting encounters attracted most of the attention (and
incited nationalist disputes on the listserv), different online discussions shifted
frequently to a consideration of the “ethnic belonging” of the participants.
Viewers pointed out repeatedly that the show was not really “real,” but was a
“Balkan mix,” since the participants were not “ethnically pure.” In keeping with
the mixed character of the former Yugoslavia, Edin, who represented Bosnia and
Herzegovina, was actually born in Montenegro, while Serbia’s Miro is ethnically
Serbian but had lived in Skopje for many years. Dijana, who represented Serbia,
is not ethnically Serbian at all: she is half Croatian and half Hungarian. Similarly,
Slovenia’s Miro is ethnically Macedonian and Croatia’s Edis is half Croatian, half
Macedonian. Perhaps not surprisingly, the lack of ethnic “purity” was invoked by
those who sought to reinforce ethnic prejudices: “How can Miro pretend to rep-
resent Slovenia? One can tell he is not a Slovene—he just lies around all the time
in his bed, does not work or initiate anything.” In other words, many of the view-
ers did not take the show as an opportunity to break down ethnic stereotypes, but
to recapitulate them.
The issue of representation recurs in an overtly political register in the vot-
ing competition that forms the central focus of the show. The participatory format
of the online world invokes the democratization of commercial culture in the
interactive era. As Ristoski puts it:
This is very different from socialist former-Yugoslavia. . . . Now, we are
allowed to vote and participate. The show proves that everything is pos-
sible when someone wants it to be possible. And it is open: the viewers
can participate while they vote . . . but also, the audience interacts and
communicates with the candidates in the house, which is not the case with
other shows. (Zoran Ristoski, personal communication, February 4, 2006)
But the equation of democracy and the “interactivity” observable in the cur-
rent popularity of reality-based programming is, to say the least, problematic. To
Sam Ja does more than celebrate interactivity and the “active” audience; it revises
recent history in the guise of commercial entertainment as postsocialist populism.
For example, on the discussion boards, the debate about history focused on World
War II and how “the Serbs were on the right side, and the Croats on the wrong
side.” As one post by “Joko” put it:
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Southern brothers, brotherhood and unity was a false utopia, but still, it
is all about the wrongs of politics. . . . I really don’t give a crap about
Croats . . . but I do want to go to the sea-side and have a quiet, peaceful
Serbian beer there . . . no hard feelings over the past. . . . [G]ive me
peace, and I’ll leave you alone. I am a good person.
But such facile pacifism is challenged repeatedly by the more aggressive and
conspiracy-theory-oriented posts, such as “Cacak’s” claim that 
Jugoslavia was already an Islamic state. . . . Tito started the process of
islamization, he got the money from Saudi Arabia. . . . First he created
Bosnia as a nation—giving the Bosnian Muslims national rights . . . what
we see today here in the Balkans is the victory of Islam. Europe doesn’t
see it, but we have been living it for the last 40 years!
The author of a Miami Herald article (Darling, 2000) observed that reality
shows tend to reinforce existing racial stereotypes. To Sam Ja similarly played
out some national stereotypes and thus helped to reinforce them. In contrast with
the activity on the listserv, the recreation of former Yugoslavia “under one roof”
did not, despite some suggestions and fears, lead to any type of serious national-
istic conflict among the participants. Most conflicts were fought on a personal,
individual level—however, the participants adopted and played out stereotypical
national roles within the former Yugoslav context.
Post-socialist individualism
The cast members discussed national and ethnic stereotypes and prejudices dur-
ing several show segments. They claimed that everyone came to the show with
specific stereotypes in mind—that, for example, Slovenes are cold and not par-
ticularly friendly, Croats are closed and dishonest, and Serbs crazy and wild. One
of the participants claimed he “worried about having a Serb in a house, but it
worked out well. . . . [A]fter all, we are all equally good individuals” (personal
communication, February 8, 2006) The Slovene candidates expressed their view
of the Croats as “big nationalists . . . because everyone in Slovenia thinks that the
Croats are too patriotic and nationalistic” (personal communication, March 4,
2006). In a personal interview, however, it was explained, 
Croats on the show were so nice. . . . We got along very well! I came to
the conclusion that they are just individuals, young people, you know,
not Croats, but young people, like me. . . . I don’t agree with politicians,
who try to use stereotypes for their own political ends. . . . They
exploited us in the past, but I understand now. (personal communication,
September 14, 2006) 
The discourse of individualism served as a filter that shaped discussions
about social realities and the daily lives of participants. As one cast member
claimed, “I did not care where the others came from. What mattered was having
fun, living together, singing . . . hanging out . . . as ourselves, you know. All the
past troubles, you know, are the past” (personal communication, January 20,
2006). This “ideology of individualism” both obstructs honest representations of
class and national relations and obfuscates the important structural causes of
nationalism. But ignoring class relations and history is not the same thing as erad-
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icating them. Stigmatizing class relations, as well as the recent history of resur-
gent nationalism, results in the return of repressed antagonisms in the form of
interpersonal conflict. According to one of the show’s participants,
We really understood each other well in the house. There were no prob-
lems. I have no problems with Muslims, with Serbs . . . or Slovenes. Yes,
we are different, but it is all about us, individuals, to make it work out.
To understand and respect each other and live with each other. (personal
communication, April 17, 2006)
The microcosm was small enough that prejudices were supposed to give way
to individual experience. Cast members, for example, may have had preconcep-
tions based on ethnicity and nationality, but the process of having to live and
work together was meant to push them beyond their preconceptions: “This show
is about resisting and questioning the barriers. And when you do that there are
arguments that result. But I think that overall, people learn a lot about each other”
(personal communication, January 17, 2006). One of the fans of the show said
that “even when and if they quarrelled, it was because personally, they had some
problems . . . not because they were coming from different cultures” (personal
communication, February 10, 2006). In this respect, participants adopted
Ristoski’s stated goals for the show, which is not particularly surprising given that
this was the way he framed it, presumably during pre-production screening as
well as in promotional materials and interviews.
Discussion and conclusion
Because the message of individualism lies at the core of reality TV as a social
experiment, it merits unpacking. It implies that the abstract character of social
relations ought to get the blame for social conflicts based on ethnicity, national-
ism, race, gender, class, or social preference. Consequently, such big-picture,
abstract social relations themselves must be set aside if our common humanity (as
fun-loving, love-making consumers united by our simple affection for transna-
tional commercial entertainment) is to come to the fore. The paradoxical result is
that our so-called common humanity takes on the character of an abstraction: it
is what would allow us all to get along if only we did not live in society, with all
its associated historical baggage. Perhaps this is an appealing promise insofar as
it mobilizes the themes of the critique of mass society: social relations have them-
selves become so abstracted that we need to abstract away from them in order to
get to know one another as individuals in all our particularity.
The danger of this solution is that it fails to recognize that an individual
deprived of social context also loses the character of his or her particularity. The
absolute individual, like a non-dimensional point in space, remains at the level of
pure abstraction. Consequently, in an effort to reveal the essence of cast members
as individuals removed from the particularity of their social-historical contexts,
To Sam Ja all but eliminated what is most crucial to the establishment of subjec-
tivity. One result of so doing is a tendency to attribute the return of repressed
political or social tensions in the form of conflicts within the household not to his-
torical struggle, but to naturalized “character traits” associated with the groups
represented by each of the cast members. Thus, the historical reduction—the
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bracketing-off of social relations—allows for the re-assertion of stereotypes,
insofar as the show retained the links between cast members and the national
groups they represented. The move might be described as inferentially national-
ist, borrowing from Stuart Hall’s description of inferential racism, which ignores
the social construction of race (Hall, 1981). 
The further implication of this approach is a hallmark of the liberal tradition
in both communication and politics: conflict is the result of mutual misunder-
standing. Once the world is shrunk to the size of a townhouse in downtown
Skopje, this formulation has its element of truth. However, the attempt to gener-
alize back to the real world, as it were, is flawed to the extent that social antago-
nisms result not always from misunderstandings, but from real conflicts between
social groups and classes and by the way that these conflicts are often represented
in ways that militate favourably to the status quo of power. It may be true that the
To Sam Ja cast shares common interests and personal experiences that favour the
attempt to move beyond stereotyped preconceptions and to forge personal bonds.
However, it is not necessarily the case that, for example, class conflict or nation-
alistic conflict is the result of mutual misunderstanding or of hackneyed stereo-
types that can be overcome thanks to the universalizing logic of postsocialist,
transnational commercial entertainment. 
Such conflict is often between groups of people who understand each other
and each other’s competing interests only too well. The assertion of an abstract,
shared humanity fails to address these conflicts, which is not to give up on the
notion of common human interests, but to suggest these are best addressed by
engaging with history and social relations rather than ignoring them. A history of
social conflict cannot be erased by ignoring it, for it gains its reality precisely
through the individuals who live out this conflict. 
Any attempt to subtract the social in order to gain the truth of the individual
is, in this respect, a deceptive move. Rather than arriving at the ineffable surplus
of individuality, reality television provides an adroit means of transposing social
relations into the realm of individual essence and thereby reinforcing the seem-
ingly natural, ahistorical character of the status quo of power. Reality TV follows
through on its promise to slip behind the inessential appearance and deliver the
essential reality by demonstrating that appearance itself is the reality. This formu-
lation is, as Z˘iz˘ek suggests, constitutive of the functioning of ideology, which in
an analysis that lends itself to a consideration of reality TV, he locates not at the
level of mental illusion, but of lived social reality: “[I]deology is not simply a
‘false consciousness,’ an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality
itself which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological’” (1989, p. 21). 
The crucial point for Z˘iz˘ek is that ideology is not to be read as false con-
sciousness, but as externalized social practice. Z˘iz˘ek’s assessment is meant to
address the impasse of ideology critique in an era characterized by the triumph of
a culture of “savvinesss” (Gitlin, 1990) and cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987),
both of which assert a knowing attitude about ideology and thereby assert their
own immunity to illusion. For Z˘iz˘ek, however, ideology is not so easily side-
stepped, but returns in the form of real activity: “[T]he illusion is not on the side
of knowledge, it is already on the side of reality itself, of what people are
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doing. . . . They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it
as if they did not know” (1989, p. 32). This formulation nicely addresses the real-
ity TV formula, wherein producers like Zoran Ristoski remain quite canny about
and conscious of questions of nationalism, but perhaps misrecognize, deliberately
or not, the way in which their actions fail to conform to their own savviness.
Thus, for example, Ristoski can talk about the importance of breaking down
stereotypes—of having former Yugoslavs live with one another in close quarters
so as to move beyond their preconceptions—while at the same time producing a
show whose practical implications undermine its ostensibly progressive agenda. 
At the level of ideas, Ristoski seems perfectly aware of the role that stereo-
typed portrayals play in reproducing and naturalizing prejudice and social injus-
tice. However, this awareness fails to penetrate the illusion embodied in the social
relations and practice reproduced by a show like To Sam Ja. The constitutive illu-
sion—what Z˘iz˘ek terms the “fantasy”—that structures Ristoski’s version of real-
ity is embodied in the way cast members and producers act: as if the Skopje house
embodies the ideal of fair equality of opportunity, in which everyone gets an
equal “start” and the individuals have been reduced to the essence of their natu-
ral personalities. To paraphrase Z˘iz˘ek’s paraphrase of Freud: the producers and
cast members know very well that individuals bring their histories and back-
grounds along with them—that their reactions and behaviours remain shaped by
the power relations within which they operate—but in practice they act as if these
relations are merely a reflection of individual essence. Such is the nature of the
fetishistic inversion performed by reality TV.
Notes
1. Tos˘e Proeski (a well-known Macedonian singer) was among the first celebrities to visit the house.
2. Predictably, there were a couple of scandals generated by and associated with the show. The pub-
lic debates at first revolved around issues of morality—an act of masturbation performed by an
Albanian participant was shown, which triggered the question of public morality (Sopar, 2005).
The public outcry in Macedonia was loud, and questions were posed about the role of Macedonian
Public Broadcasting, about the commercialization of its programs, and about the types of shows it
helps to produce and eventually to broadcast. On the whole, in Macedonia, broadcasting has been
increasingly defined in commercial terms. Traditional views that broadcasting is a public service
are being subordinated to marketplace logic. MKRTV struggles with the same problems as other
public/national television stations around the world. To start with, increasing financial problems
have been discovered, and MKRTV continues to lack sufficient financing. The loss of its program
identity is the second problem. As elsewhere, in competing with commercial channels, MKRTV
has adopted characteristics of commercial television. The third problem is increased dependency
on advertising revenues, resulting in an increased percentage of commercial programming (mostly
U.S.) and a decreased share of costly in-house production.
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